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Summary in Russian and English

EVIDENTIAL STRATEGIES IN LATIN*

1. Introduction

Evidentiality is a linguistic category whose primary meaning is source of information.[1] According to the basic classification of the ways knowledge can be obtained, evidentials encode different modes of access to information. The main types of evidence, therefore, can be divided into three groups, i.e. direct (perceptual, visual, firsthand), indirect inferential (obtained by means of inferring or induction based on the state of affairs or traces resulting from a previous actions) and indirect reported.[2] Languages vary in how many types of information sources they can express and whether they do it compulsorily or optionally. Thus, when an event is directly observable by both speaker and hearer, evidentials are rarely used.[3] On the contrary, an indirect source of information is marked more frequently. Languages which compulsorily specify a source of information may express it in a variety of ways. Some of them have special affixes or clitics,[4] while in other languages evidential markers are fused with markers of other categories. In languages with grammatical evidentiality, marking how one knows something is a must. Leaving this out results in a grammatically awkward "incomplete" sentence.[5]

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   [1] Aikhenvald 2004, 3.

   [2] About the classification of evidential values in detail see Plungian 2001, 353; 2010, 37.

   [3] Anderson 1986, 277.

   [4] Most of the languages with special evidential affixes and clitics are spread in the North and South America. There are also languages with overtly expressed evidentials among Tibeto-Burman, Balcan and some other families (Aikhenvald, Dixon 1998, 245).

   [5] Aikhenvald 2004, 6.

There is no doubt that the linguistic devices encoding the source of information do exist in every language but differ significantly in their grammatical status. In almost all languages, a source of information can be expressed lexically, for example, by "seemingly" or "reportedly" in English, "якобы", "мол", "дескать" in Russian, "il paraît que" in French, etc. Hence, the essential part of studies on evidentiality is occupied by the discussion on the nature of evidential markers: that is, are they part of a grammatical system or belong to the lexicon of the language?[6]

From the angle of such a dichotomy, languages can be divided into three groups:

1) languages in which evidentiality has been grammaticalized,
2) languages which render this category by lexical means, and
3) languages where evidential meanings are not conveyed by specific forms, but are occasionally expressed by forms whose central meaning is something else.[7]

A very apt definition "evidential strategies" was suggested by A. Aikhenvald[8] for such forms or constructions which somehow relate to the source of information (i.e., in essence, for the third group in Lazard's classification). She claimed that a grammatical technique is an evidential strategy if, in addition to its primary meaning, it can acquire one or more semantic features characteristic of evidentiality proper. Such strategies are devices whose evidential value becomes apparent only as a side effect. Thus, in a number of languages, forms of future or perfect tenses, passive constructions, modal expressions and so forth acquire inferential meanings which are not obligatory and appear only in certain kinds of linguistic or situational context. In the present study, I will try to show that the definition "evidential strategies" corresponds well to the evidential grammatical techniques we can single out in Latin. It is worth stressing that evidential functions in the linguistic units under consideration result only from the *interaction* with the context and does not reside in the units taken in isolation. The mechanisms of interaction triggering a "joint" evidential meaning belong to the realm of pragmatics and operate on stable meaning components other than properly evidential.[9]

Fortunately, over the last years the question of whether evidentiality is restricted to grammatical marking, which would preclude considering lexical expressions as evidentiality proper, has received due attention, and

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[6] A critical review of points under discussion is given in Boye–Harde 2009, 9–14.
[7] Lazard 2001, 360.
[8] Aikhenvald 2004.
[9] Wiemer–Stathi 2010, 279.

many authors have argued that, given that evidentiality is a functional domain, it cannot be restricted to cases of obligatory grammatical marking.[10] In this vein, G. Lampert and M. Lampert[11] have suggested to conceptualize evidentiality as a multi-dimensional contextual category and to include within the category "all linguistic representations that serve as cues for evidentiality in context". Such an attitude to the problem seems quite reasonable, especially in the light of the fact that the evidential functions of grammatical markers are often inherited from their lexical sources (e.g. speech act or perceptive verbs with or without complementizers), and therefore the grammatical evidentials prove to be connected with lexical ones by genetic association.

According to B. Wiemer,[12] the distinction between grammatical and lexical evidentiality is not to be regarded as a dual polarity, but rather as a gradual continuum ranging from "highly grammaticalized" over "less grammaticalized" to lexical.

In my study, I argue that in this gradual continuum Latin occupies the medial position. Methodologically, I will apply an approach to evidentiality as a category which is not necessarily expressed by a restricted number of special markers, but may have different strategies for "the linguistic coding of epistemology".[13]

It is worth mentioning that epistemic modality and evidentiality are partly overlapping categories and their interaction is a highly discussed problem. A detailed analysis of literature on the topic is beyond the scope of this paper but a few remarks may be of use. Thus, it is worth mentioning that in the early works on evidentiality it was often treated as a subcategory of epistemic modality, in the latest studies, on the contrary, quite a few scholars consider evidentiality and epistemic modality as two different categories which, however, are very close to each other and are often expressed by the same means.[14] The affinity of these two categories is particularly obvious from the angle of rethinking evidentiality as encoding the mode of access rather than the source of information. What combines evidentiality with epistemic modality is the speaker's "attitude towards knowledge".[15] From this point of view, a category which encodes the source of information is evidentiality in a narrow sense, whereas a category marking the speaker's attitude towards

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[10] Cornillie et al. 2015, 3.
[11] Lampert–Lampert 2010, 319.
[12] Wiemer 2010, 63.
[13] Chafe–Nichols 1986; Aikhenvald 2004.
[14] Plungian 2010, 44–46; Haßler 2010, 239.
[15] Givon 1982; Chafe 1986, 262; Willett 1988, 52.

knowledge is evidentiality in a broad sense.[16] As T. Willett has shown, there is an interaction between evidentiality in the narrow and broad senses. In some languages with dedicated markers of evidentiality, they qualify information not only on the basis of its source but also on the basis of "precision", "probability" and "expectation".[17]

In recent studies, one can witness an intention to find out new explanations of why evidential and epistemic markers often coincide. B. Wiemer[18] put forward a notion *reliability* as an intermediate layer between evidential and epistemic meanings. With reference to de Haan[19] he argues that epistemic modality and evidentiality both deal with evidence but differ in what they do with that evidence: epistemic modality *evaluates* evidence and on the basis of this evaluation assigns a confidence measure to the speaker's utterance while an evidential *asserts* that there is evidence for the speaker's utterance but does not interpret the evidence in any way. Reliability, according to Wiemer, is the crucial concept *mediating* between reference to information source and epistemic judgment; however, it cannot be equated with either of them.

Since the eighties, evidentiality has become such a topical issue that the number of studies concerning evidential markers and strategies in the languages of the world has been increasing continuously. Over the last five or six years, there have appeared some important works concerning evidentiality in the dead languages as well.[20] Their authors make an attempt to regard particular grammatical phenomena and lexical expressions as relating to linguistic coding of information source. Van Rooy[21] recently demonstrated the relevance of evidentiality for Ancient Greek. As regards Latin, a systematic overview of evidential strategies seems to have been still lacking. The aim of the present study is therefore to make such an overview that would be important both for the linguistic typology and – even more importantly – for the reinterpretation of some Latin grammatical phenomena whose meaning has so far been restricted only to tense, mode or voice in traditional Latin grammars. I will try to show that these phenomena may have evidential extensions. My claim is that strategies under consideration are part of Latin grammatical rather than lexical system, if one follows the extended notion of "grammatical system" which may include not only suffixes, clitics or particles, but

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[16] Willett 1988, 54.
[17] Willett 1988, 55.
[18] Wiemer 2017a, 646.
[19] De Haan 1999, 85.
[20] Cuzzolin 2010, Greco 2013, Guardamagna 2017.
[21] Van Rooy 2016.

also auxiliaries and free syntactic forms.[22] The pure lexical expressions referring to the source of information could be a subject of further investigation.[23]

Latin grammatical system seems to provide both morphological and syntactic means to convey all the basic sources of knowledge, i.e. direct (attested), indirect inferring and indirect reported evidences.

2. Direct evidence

Concerning direct evidence, one would say that it can be expressed lexically by simple indicative forms of the perception verbs such as *video, audio, sentio* etc., but it is not the case because this would violate one of the important conditions for identifying archetypal evidentials suggested by Anderson: "Evidentials are not themselves the main predication of the clause, but are rather a specification added to a factual claim about something else".[24] Perception verbs actually have the indication of evidence as their primary meaning, but they are themselves the main predication of the clause and, therefore, cannot be treated as direct evidentials. Hence, we should look for alternative means of expressing direct evidence which are expected to correlate with Anderson's principle.

2.1. *The Participle and Infinitive Constructions*

The first strategy to express direct evidence is the Accusative with Participle construction (*Accusativus cum Participio [AcP], Participium praedicativum* in terms of traditional grammars)[25] governed by the verbs of perception, or *verba sentiendi* (*videre* 'to see', *audire* 'to hear' etc.), as exemplified in 1–3:

> (1) **M. Catonem vidi** in bibliotheca **sedentem** (Cic. *Fin.* 3. 2. 7).
>
> I saw M. Cato sitting in the library.
>
> (2) hostes vero, notis omnibus vadis, ubi ex litore **aliquos** singulares ex navi **egredientes conspexerant**, incitatis equis impeditos adoriebantur (Caes. *BG* 4. 26. 2).

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[22] Anderson 1986, 275.

[23] It is worth stressing that functionally the inflectional systems cannot make as many distinctions in evidential values as productive syntactic systems (Woodbury 1984, 202).

[24] Anderson 1986, 274–275.

[25] The evidential value of the Accusative with Participle construction has already been investigated by Greco 2013.

But the enemy, who were acquainted with all the shallows, when from the shore they saw any coming from a ship one by one, spurred on their horses.

(3) Timoleon, quum aetate iam provectus esset, sine ullo morbo lumina oculorum amisit. Quam calamitatem ita moderate tulit, ut neque **eum querentem** quisquam **audierit...** (Nep. 20. 4. 1).

Timoleon in old age without disease lost his sight. He suffered this misfortune so patiently that no one heard him complaining.

The status of this construction as grammaticalized sensory direct evidential rests on the fact that neither the governing verb nor the participle *per se* can be regarded as evidentials: it is in this particular construction, that they receive the evidential value. Importantly, the propositional content of the utterance is rendered by the *AcP* rather than the governing verb which is semantically the perception verb, hence, Anderson's condition is not violated.

Such a strategy is attested in a number of languages. Thus, in English, the sentence 4

(4) I **heard France beating** Brazil[26]

implies that "I actually heard how this happened" (for instance, by radio), that means a direct perception.

In Latin, the verbs of perception can also govern the Accusative with Infinitive construction (*Accusativus cum Infinitivo*, *AcI*), and given it contains Present Infinitive,[27] which implies simultaneity of actions expressed by the governing verb and the infinitive, the *AcI* also acquires the meaning of direct sensory evidential,[28] as in example 5:

(5) sed **eccos video incedere** patrem sodalis et magistrum (Plaut. *Bacchid.* 403).

But I see them approaching: the father of my friend and his tutor.

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[26] The example is taken from Aikhenvald 2004, 118.

[27] The importance of the grammatical tense should be stressed here. According to Woodbery 1986, 188, "when grammatical categories occur together, their semantic content limits the ways they can interact", in other words, the experiential (direct) value of the *AcI* is possible because the grammatical tense of the governing verb and the infinitive is the same. Otherwise, the resulting evidential value would be nonexperiential (indirect): Woodbery 1986, 198.

[28] Greco 2013, 181.

As it has been demonstrated, both participle and infinitive construction can occupy the same syntactic position and be treated as a strategy expressing direct evidence. The question arises what the difference is. This point proved to be highly discussed. P. Greco[29] convincingly argues that these two subordinate clauses which can be governed by verbs of perception, differ, however, in their syntactic distribution and, allegedly, in their meaning. The *AcI* construction has a wider distribution insofar as it can occur after all types of perception, cognition, and utterance predicates while the *AcP*, on the contrary, can only be governed by perception verbs. According to traditional Latin grammars,[30] *AcI* is used to convey cognition meanings while *AcP* expresses a perceptual meaning. In other words, "the difference between the two constructions is that in the case of the *AcP* the aspect of 'perception' is central, and with the *AcI* that of 'cognition' and 'reflection' "[31] is most significant. Interestingly, the *AcP* may always be replaced by a corresponding *AcI*, while the converse is not true. As is clearly highlighted by Greco with reference to Riemann,[32] in most cases the context allows both a direct and an indirect perception interpretation, and sometimes *AcI* is used "dans des cas où […] on attendrait le participe".[33] However, Riemann considers the latter cases to be instances of "popular Latin".

The cases of *AcI* and *NcI* as indirect evidential strategies will be considered in the following sections.

2.2. *Historic present*

There is a stylistic device in Latin which makes an impression of a particular nearness. It is the historic present, which was referred to by Roman scholars as *demonstratio* or *evidentia,* and its definition surprisingly resembles that of the direct firsthand evidential:

> Demonstratio est, cum ita verbis res exprimitur ut geri negotium et res ante oculos esse videatur (*Rhet. Her.* 4. 68).

> *Demonstratio* is a way to express something in words so that it seemed as though events and things were taking place before our eyes.

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[29] Greco 2013, 178–179.
[30] Riemann 1890, 469–470; Kühner–Stegmann 1966, 703–704; Hoffmann–Szantyr 1965, 387–388.
[31] Pinkster 1990, 131.
[32] Greco 2013, 178 n. 15.
[33] Riemann 1890, 470 n. 1.

The historic present creates an impression of the eyewitness report and is especially appropriate to texts characterized by a lot of detail.[34] See ex. 6:

> (6) (Troilus) **fertur** equis curruque **haeret** resupinus inani
> lora tenens tamen. Huic cervixque comaeque **trahuntur**
> per terram et versa pulvis **inscribitur** hasta (Verg. *Aen*. 1. 476–478).

> (Troilus) is carried along by his horses and fallen backwards, clings to the empty car, yet clasping the reigns; his neck and hair are dragged over the ground and the dust is scored by his reverse spear.

All the verbs marked in semi-bold are the historic present forms which describe the events of a distant past in a historic narrative as if the author had observed them personally.

The use of historic present is particularly appropriate for epic and folklore texts because it emphasizes the participation of the listener or reader in action, which reduces the distance between *hic et nunc* and the space of the text.[35]

2.3. *Impersonal passive*

There is one more stylistic device to express sensory perceived direct evidence: this is the impersonal passive.

Generally speaking, passive forms including impersonal passive in many languages can be used as evidential strategies with inferential value. Thus, in Lithuanian, the impersonal passive is used when some direct physical evidence is available for the statement.[36] The evidence is based on visible results. Since the inpersonal passive in Lithuanian is formed with the past passive participle (with an optional copula), which has a typical perfect meaning, it marks past actions still relevant to present, and its evidential extensions are similar to those expected for a perfect or resultative.[37] As regards the Latin language, it also uses impersonal passive forms to express different evidential values. Some occurrences seem to have overtones of direct evidentials, as in ex. 7:

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[34] Pinkster 2015, 402.

[35] Makartsev 2013 [М. М. Макарцев, *Эвиденциальность в пространстве балканского текста*], 225.

[36] See examples in Petit 1998, 106; Blevins 2003, 497–498; Aikhenvald 2004, 116; Wiemer 2007 [Б. Вимер, "Косвенная засвидетельствованность в литовском языке", in: В. С. Храковский (ed.), *Эвиденциальность в языках Европы и Азии*], 213–215.

[37] Aikhenvald 2004, 116.

> (7) **Itur** ad te, Pseudole. Orationem tibi para advorsum senem (Pl. *Pseud*. 453–454).
>
> You're being approached, Pseudolus. Prepare your speech against the old man.

Eliminating the subject allows the speaker to focus on the action as such and to represent a situation as attested by the speaker or any other observer of the situation. These features can be considered as direct evidential implications.

There are also contexts where one can hardly distinguish between direct evidential and inferential overtones, as in ex. 8:

> (8) Sed crepuit ostium. **Exitur** foras (Pl. *Cas*. 813).
>
> But the door has creaked. They are coming out.

The impersonal passive *exitur* can be treated either as a representation of a situation perceived directly by the speaker (i.e. direct evidence) or as a conclusion drawn from the previously described action (i.e. inference).

It should be stressed that all instances of the impersonal passive with presumably evidential meaning are contextually determined and occur only in the language of Roman comedy. They are also restricted to the clauses with impersonal passives implying uncertain or plural agent or 1st person agent. To sum up, it is a convenient grammatical device which gives a possibility to witness an action but avoids reference to its agent, as exemplified in 9 and 10:

> (9) Quid agitur? – Statur. – Video (Ter. *Eu*. 270–271).
>
> What are you doing? – I am standing here. – I see.

> (10) Salve. Quid agitur? – Statur hic ad hunc modum (Pl. *Pseud.* 457).
>
> Hallo! What are you doing? – Just stand here.

It should be mentioned that contextually determined character of the Lithuanian impersonal passives is clearly stated by Wiemer[38] with reference to many scholars. He underlines that past passive participles which are found in the Lithuanian evidential constructions, especially preserving copulas, are hardly distinguished from the standard perfect forms. They need context to realize their evidential meaning. The same holds true for the Latin evidential strategies under consideration.

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[38] Wiemer 2007, 206.

3. Indirect evidence

3.1. *Indirect inferring evidence*

Normally, indirect inferring or presumptive evidence is obtained by means of inferring or induction based on the state of affairs or traces resulting from a previous action. The Latin language provides a number of devices that can be treated as inferential evidential strategies. One of them has already been discussed (I mean the impersonal passive which shares properties of direct and inferential evidentials). Now I turn to other grammatical expressions of non-firsthand information. Some of them will have overtons of probability, expectation, uncertainty, subjectivity or distance.

3.1.1. The Nominative with Infinitive construction

The first to be analyzed is the Nominative with Infinitive construction (*Nominativus cum infinitivo, NcI*) governed by the verb *videri 'to seem'*, as in ex. 11:

> (11) **Ille** mi **par esse** deo **videtur**,
> ille, si fas est, **superare** divos,
> qui sedens adversus identidem te
>   spectat et audit
> dulce ridentem (Catull. 51. 1–5).

> He seems to me to be equal to a god, he, if such were lawful, to surpass the gods, who sitting across from you again and again gazes on you, and listens to you sweetly laughing (transl. by L. C. Smithers).

The inferential value of the construction governed by *videtur* is determined by the state of affairs that is described in the lines 3–5.

The verb *videri* 'to seem' is the present passive form of the verb *videre* 'to see', and acquires its particular meaning 'to seem' not only in the Nominative with Infinitive construction, but also in the clauses with noun predicates, where it functions as an auxiliary verb, see examples 12–15:

> (12) Peregrina facies **videtur** hominis atque ignobilis (Pl. *Pseud*. 964).

> The man's face seems strange and unfamiliar.

> (13) Audin, furcifer quae loquitur? satin magnificus tibi **videtur**? (Pl. *Pseud*. 194).

> Do you hear how the jailbird talks? Hasn't he a magnificent air? (transl. by H. Th. Riley).

(14) Illud, quia in Scaevola factum est, magis indignum **videtur**, hoc, quia fit a Chrysogono, non est ferendum (Cic. *Rosc*. 34. 5).

The one action, because it was done against Scaevola, appears scandalous; this one, because it is done by Chrysogonus, is intolerable (transl. by C. D. Yonge).

(15) Is enim mihi **videtur** amplissimus qui sua virtute in altiorem locum pervenit, non qui ascendit per alterius incommodum et calamitatem (Cic. *Rosc*. 83. 4).

For that man appears to me the most honourable who arrives at a higher rank by his own virtue, not he who rises by the distress and misfortunes of another (transl. by C. D. Yonge).

In all passages under consideration, the verb *videri* 'to seem' aquires its inferential meaning due to the context describing the circumstances under which the inference is made.[39]

Importantly, *videri* 'to seem' becomes an evidential marker both as the verb governing *NcI* and as an auxiliary verb. In both cases it cannot be treated as main predication of the clause and thus corresponds to the Anderson's condition (see section 1).

The Nominative with Infinitive construction governed by *videri* 'to seem' can be compared with similar constructions attested in the European languages, for instance, the Complex subject in English (cf. English translation of ex. 7), and the German construction with *scheinen* in which this verb changes its original meaning from 'shine' to 'seem', as exemplified in 16:

(16) Sie scheint ihn zu kennen.

She seems to know him.[40]

In the same vein, the Greek constructions with φαίνεται are used, ex. 17:

(17) ἡμῖν μὲν Ἑρμῆς οὐκ ἄκαιρα φαίνεται λέγειν (Aesch. *PV* 1036–1037).

Hermes seems to me to speak resonably.

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[39] The contextually determined evidential meaning of the *seem*-constructions is stressed in Lampert–Lampert 2010, 314–318.

[40] The example is taken from Hansen 2007, 250, who insists on the grammatical rather than lexical character of this means of expressing inferential value.

When analyzing properties of the verbs with similar semantics in other languages, G. Lambert and M. Lambert underline that "[*seem*]... may become an evidential marker if one draws upon the relevant context, functioning as an attentional *cueing* device toward the contextually sanctioned meaning of the construction in which *seem* is a component".[41]

As regards grammatical vs. lexical status of such constructions, I will join to the opinion of G. Diewald and E. Smirnova: "The German evidential constructions *werden* & infinitive and *scheinen* / *drohen* / *versprechen* & zu-infinitive, like many analogous constructions in other languages found in the Indo-European family, clearly are of an intermediate stage as concerns the degree of grammaticalization. They are not yet full-fledged grammaticalized evidential systems as compared to those systems invoked by Aikhenvald, which have inflectional or clitic evidential markers, but they are instances of evidential systems on the rise".[42]

3.1.2. The potential subjunctive

The inferring evidential value can be conveyed by the potential subjunctive, ex. 18:

> (18)   Non tibi sunt integra lintea,
> non di, quos iterum pressa **voces** malo (Hor. *Carm*. 1. 14. 9–10).

> You have neither unharmed sail, nor images of the gods, that you **could pray** time and again when suffering disaster.

In this example, the deductive use of the present subjunctive **voces** is determined by the state of affairs that Horace describes in the preceding context: the sail is harmed, and the images of the protecting gods are swept away by the storm, therefore, the ship suppressed by the disaster will hardly achieve success in praying them.

This means of expressing inferential value is morphological, but not special, because, like in many languages, it belongs to the forms whose central meaning is rather hypothetical or presumptive (i.e. modal) than evidential *stricto sensu*. It is this zone of evidential category, that overlaps with epistemic modality. The fact that a question of probability arises, indicates that the speaker has no direct knowledge of a situation,[43] and this relates to indirect evidentiality.

The intersection of these two categories is successfully explained by V. Plungian: "If we regard such values as modal, we stress one of the basic

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[41] Lambert–Lambert 2010, 316.
[42] Diewald–Smirnova 2010, 4.
[43] Plungian 2001, 354.

characteristics of modality, namely the assessment of a situation (as highly probable); regarding it as evidential, we stress one of the basic characteristics of evidentiality, namely the reference to logical conclusions as a source of information about a situation. This way, markers of presumptive evidentiality are the only evidential markers with inbuilt modal components and the only modal markers with inbuilt evidential components".[44]

It is worth stressing that inferential value of a potential subjunctive seems to be restricted to the 2nd and 3rd persons and to only certain types of clauses. It is seen best of all in the relative clauses (ex. 10) with the consecutive meaning and in the conditional periods of a potential type, where the subjunctive mood is used both in the main clauses and in the *si*-clauses (ex. 19):

> (19) si exsistat hodie ab inferis Lycurgus, gaudeat ruinis eorum (sc. moenium), et nunc se patriam et Spartam antiquam agnoscere dicat (Liv. 39. 37. 3).

> If Lycurgus had risen from the dead, he would have rejoiced because of the destruction of the walls and would have said that he saw again ancient Sparta.

In these types of clauses, the subjunctive has overtones of uncertainty featuring the non-firsthand information.[45]

Such overtones of uncertainty may be discerned in some independent uses of the potential subjunctive, ex. 20:

> (20) iniussu signa referunt, maestique – crederes uictos – exsecrantes nunc imperatorem, nunc nauatam ab equite operam, redeunt in castra (Liv. 2. 43. 9).

> Contrary to orders they retreated and returned to their camp, in such dejection that you would have supposed them beaten, now uttering execrations against their leader and now against the efficient services of the horse (transl. by B. O. Foster).

The parallels to this evidential strategy can be found in a number of languages.[46]

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[44] Plungian 2010, 46.

[45] Aikhenvald 2004, 106 et passim.

[46] Cf. Konjunktiv I in German (Hansen 2007, 244–245), Conditionnel présent in French (Guentchéva 1994; Kordi 2007 [Е. Е. Корди, "Категория эвиденциальности во французском языке", in: В. С. Храковский (ed.), *Эвиденциальность в языках Европы и Азии*], 258–262), Modul conjunctiv and Modul prezumtiv in Romanian (Manea 2005).

3.1.3. Latin Perfect tenses with resultative meaning

In many languages with overtly grammaticalized evidential markers, this category overlaps with that of tense, aspect or person.[47]

The inferential overtones of perfect tenses are understandable from the angle of their resultative meaning. The primary meaning of the perfect is to focus on the results of an action, and an inference is based on the traces or results of a previous action or state. Hence, there is a semantic link between a non-firsthand evidential and a perfect. The examples of such an evidential strategy are found in some Caucasian, Iranian, Scandinavian languages, in Spanish of La Paz and so forth.[48] Historically, the Latin perfect inherited markers and values of two different tenses: a perfect tense proper and an aorist. Therefore, there are two meanings of classical Latin perfect: the historic perfect which denotes an action or process finished in the past (this is a heritage of the aorist) and the present perfect with a resultative meaning.

My claim is that the latter may have an inferential value in some contexts. Let us see ex. 21 and 22:

> (21) **Occisi sumus** (Plaut. *Bacch*. 681).
>
> We're dead.

> (22) **Perii**, **interii**, **occidi**! Quo curram? Quo non curram? (Plaut. *Aul*. 713).
>
> I'm done for, I'm killed, I'm murdered. Where should I run? Where shouldn't I run?

The conclusions made by the characters of the Plautus pieces are made on the basis of assessing the results of previous actions and thus can be compared with the inferring evidential.

As H. Pinkster pointed out,[49] instances like ex. 21, with a passive participle in combination with *sum*, that must be interpreted as states resulting from a previous terminative action or process, are easier to find than perfect active forms. This is presumably because a prototypical passive involves focusing attention on the original object and state it is in, as a result of an action.[50] As a consequence, passives often have resultative connotations, and this property has already been highlighted in section 2.3. with regard to the impersonal passive. It doesn't therefore come as a surprise that in cases like ex. 21, the inferential value of the perfect is reinforced by the passive.

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[47] Willett 1988, 56.
[48] Aikhenvald 2004, 112–116.
[49] Pinkster 2015, 447.
[50] Aikhenvald 2004, 116.

3.1.4. Latin Future tenses with inferential overtones

Interestingly, an inferential evidence can be expressed by future tenses as well. Apart from its purely temporal use, the simple future is also used with all sorts of less temporal or even non-temporal values. There are various labels for these uses, which in practice are not always easy to distinguish and can best be regarded as contextually determined variants.[51]

Future indicative forms can develop extensions to do with inference and speculation, because they have overtones of uncertainty and prediction associated with future and can, therefore, be compared with the potential subjunctive.[52]

The future indicative is sometimes used in sentences containing a conclusion which is based on evidence mentioned in the context or on general knowledge. Examples of such a 'deductive' use of the future are 23, 24:[53]

> (23) Haec **erit** bono genere nata. Nil scit nisi verum loqui (Plaut. *Per*. 645).
>
> She'll be from a good family; she knows how to speak nothing but the truth.

> (24) Sed profecto hoc sic **erit**:
> centum doctum hominum consilia sola haec devincit dea,
> Fortuna (Pl. *Pseud*. 677–679).
>
> In fact, this is always the case: the decision of a hundred wise men is won by this goddess, Fortune.

It is worth mentioning that in some languages the grammaticalized evidentials go back to the future markers.[54]

3.1.5. The deductive use of debeo

The deductive, or presumptive evidence can also be expressed with the help of the verb *debeo* ('must'), exs. 25, 26:

> (25) 'Plane' inquam 'hic **debet** servus esse nequissimus' (Petron. *Sat*. 49. 7).
>
> Definitely, it must be a worthless slave.

> (26) Sex pondo et selibram **debet habere** (Petron. *Sat*. 67. 7).
>
> She must have six-and-a-half pounds of gold on her.

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[51] Pinkster 2015, 425.

[52] The affinity of the future and the present subjunctive is underlined by Pinkster 2015, 427.

[53] Examples 20–23 are taken from Pinkster 2015, 447; 426.

[54] Aikhenvald 2004, 111.

Evidential strategy of this type is also well attested for English *must*, French *devoir* and German *sollen*, see examples 27–29:

> (27) It must have been a kid.

> (28) Il devait avoir bû plus que de coutume.

> He must have drunk more than usual.

> (29) Er soll ein guter Lehrer sein.

> He must be a good teacher.

A question arises whether such modal verbs should be treated as evidential strategy or they are just lexical expressions of presumptive evidentiality. The crucial criterion in answering this question, according to Aikhenvald,[55] is whether or not they form special grammatical constructions in which they acquire additional meanings related to an information source. It seems, that Latin *debere* is a case in point because it definitely acquires a special inferential value when it is construed with infinitives, as in ex. 25 and 26, by contrast with ex. 30, where inferential value can hardly be seen:

> (30) ...mihi hodie attulerit miles quinque quas **debet** minas (Plaut. *Pseud*. 373).

> Today the warrior will bring me five minas, which he owes me.

Inferential interpretation of Latin '*debere* + Infinitive' construction by no means precludes a possibility for it to express the logical necessity, nevertheless, as it has been underlined many times in this paper, both inferential and modal interpretation must be confirmed by the context.

The overlapping of evidentiality and epistemic modality has already been discussed in section 1 and exemplified in section 3.1.2. with regard to the occurrences of the potential subjunctive with inferential overtones. The ability of a linguistic unit to express simultaneously epistemic and evidential values has resulted in creating a term "epistential".[56] Evidential systems of such a type were defined as "modalized" by Plungian[57] who explains the affinity of these two phenomena as follows:

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[55] Aikhenvald 2004, 150.
[56] Lampert and Lampert 2010, 314.
[57] Plungian 2001, 354–355; 2010, 49.

Indeed, an utterance which refers to the fact that a situation takes or took place, due to the existence of convincing reasons for it, is actually not different from one referring to the epistemic necessity of this situation: in both cases the speakers do not intend to become personally convinced of the fact a situation takes or took place, but consider it as highly credible, due to certain cause-and-effect relations known to them [...] The existence of a marker of epistemic necessity is therefore, if taken for itself, not an indicator for the presence of the grammatical expression of evidentiality within the system of a language. However, markers of this kind always exhibit an intersection of modal and evidential values.[58]

3.2. *Indirect reported evidence*

According to Aikhenvald,[59] reported speech can be viewed as a universal evidential strategy. In Latin, means to express reported evidence occupy the borderline position between grammar and lexicon.

3.2.1. The Accusative (Nominative) with Infinitive construction and the subjunctive mood in reported speech

The *AcI / NcI* governed by speech verbs (*verba dicendi*) is one of the most frequent constructions which encode reported speech in Latin. They cannot be regarded as pure grammaticalized evidentials because they depend on the verbs of speaking as lexical elements, but they can be definitely called evidential strategies. See exs. 31–32:

(31) Ais Democritum dicere **innumerabiles esse mundos** (Cic. *Acad.* 2. 55)

You claim that Democritus said the worlds to be innumerable.

(32) Epaminondas fidibus praeclare cecinisse dicitur (Cic. *Tusc*. 1. 4).

Epaminondas is said to have played the lyre beautifully.

Nevertheless, there is a pure grammaticalized *AcI* when used in a historical narrative with the omission of a governing verb, as in ex. 33:

(33) (milites)... legatos ex suo numero ad Caesarem mittunt: **sese paratos esse** portas aperire, quaeque imperaverit, facere (Caes. *BCiv*. 1. 20. 5).

(soldiers) sent to Caesar the ambassadors from their number and said that they were ready to open the gates and carry out all his orders.

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58 Plungian 2010, 46.
59 Aikhenvald 2004, 19.

It is worth noticing that the *AcI* along with the subjunctive mood is always used in passages which contain the reported speech. As a rule, in the reported speech the main declarative sentences are converted into the *AcI* while the dependent declarative, imperative or interrogative sentences are converted into the clauses with the subjunctive. Both the *AcI* and the subjunctive clauses form an evidential strategy for rendering reported evidentials. Thus, in ex. 34 all the verbs marked in semi-bold are either subjunctives or infinitives.

> (34) [is (Divico) ita cum Caesare egit]: si pacem populus Romanus cum Helvetiis **faceret**, in eam partem **ituros** atque ibi **futuros Helvetios** ubi eos Caesar **constituisset** atque **esse voluisset**; sin bello persequi **perseveraret**, **reminisceretur** et veteris incommodi populi Romani et pristinae virtutis Helvetiorum. quod improviso unum pagum **adortus esset**, cum ii qui flumen **transissent**, suis auxilium ferre non **possent**, ne ob eam rem aut suae magnopere virtuti **tribueret** aut ipsos **despiceret** (Caes. *BG* 1. 13. 3–6).

> He thus treats with Caesar: that, if the Roman people would make peace with the Helvetii they would go to that part and there remain, where Caesar might appoint and desire them to be; but if he should persist in persecuting them with war that he ought to remember both the ancient disgrace of the Roman people and the characteristic valor of the Helvetii. As to his having attacked one canton by surprise, [at a time] when those who had crossed the river could not bring assistance to their friends, that he ought not on that account ascribe very much to his own valor, or despise them.

3.2.2. Logophoric use of the reflexive pronoun

In addition to the *AcI* and subjunctive mood, Latin provides one more device for encoding evidentiality. This is the logophoric use of the reflexive pronoun.[60] One of the important functions of logophoric pronouns is to indicate whether the speaker and the subject or the object of a dependent predication is the same person or not, hence, logophoric markers help to reduce ambiguity in indicating the source of information.[61]

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[60] The term *logophor* was introduced by C. Hagège (1974) to refer to the source of indirect discource: logophoric elements, which occur in embedded clauses introduced by verbs of saying, thinking or feeling, must be bound by the antecedent whose speech, thoughts, or feelings are being reported. The phenomenon was first observed in African languages that have a distinct set of logophoric pronouns that are morphologically differentiated from regular pronouns. In Latin, the indirect reflexive pronouns may serve the same function as logophoric pronouns.

[61] Nikitina 2012a, 242; 2012b, 296.

The affinity of logophoric markers and evidentials has been pointed out in literature.[62] In ex. 35, which exemplifies the reported speech, the reflexive pronoun *sibi* in the dependent predication is coreferential with Caesar, who is the subject of the main predication, and represents him as a source of information.

> (35) His **Caesar**$_i$ ita respondit: eo **sibi**$_i$ minus dubitationis dari, quod eas res, quas legati Helvetii commemorassent, memoria teneret, atque eo gravius ferre, quo minus merito populi Romani accidissent (Caes. *BG* 1. 14. 1).

> To these words Caesar thus replied: that on that very account he felt less hesitation, because he kept in remembrance those circumstances which the Helvetian ambassadors had mentioned, and that he felt the more indignant at them, in proportion as they had happened undeservedly to the Roman people.

The advantage of the Latin logophoric reflexive pronoun as a reliable marker of the information source is much more obvious, if one compare example 36 with its translation into English – the language where logophoric pronoun is lacking:

> (36) **Ariovistus**$_i$ respondit, si quid ipsi a Caesare$_j$ opus est, **sese**$_i$ ad eum$_j$ venturum fuisse; si quid ille$_j$ **se**$_i$ velit, illum$_j$ ad **se** venire oportere (Caes. *BG* 1. 34. 5).

> Ariovistus replied that if he himself had needed anything from Caesar, he would have gone to him; and that if Caesar wanted anything from him he ought to come to him (transl. by W. A. McDevitte and W. S. Bohn).

In this passage, Ariovistus as a source of information is consistently coreferential with the reflexive pronoun whereas his addressee Caesar – with the anaphoric pronoun. In the English translation, on the contrary, both participants are replaced by anaphoric pronoun 'he' that creates ambiguity.

3.2.3. The reason clauses with the conjunctions quod / quia / quoniam

Latin reason clauses introduced by the conjunctions *quod / quia / quoniam* can be used with predicates either in the indicative or in the subjunctive mood. In case of the indicative mood, a reason is represented

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[62] Dimmendaal 2001; Aikhenvald 2004, 133; Wiemer 2007, 230.

as a reliable, objective one, without any additional connotation, while the subjunctive mood, on the contrary, adds the overtones of uncertainty, subjectivity, distance, that is of unreliable information the speaker does not vouch for, as in ex. 37 and 38:

(37) Aristides ... nonne ob eam causam expulsus est patria, **quod** praeter modum iustus **esset**? (Cic. *Tusc.* 5. 105).

Aristides ... was not he banished from his country because he **was supposedly** too just?

(38) Nunc mea mater irata est mihi,
quia non **redierim** domum ad se... (Plaut. *Cist.* 101–102).

Now my mother's angry with me, **on the grounds that** I didn't return home to her...

In these examples, the subjunctive is used because the speaker does not commit himself to the content of the reason clause and try to distance himself from the information offered in the subordinate clause.[63] It allows the speaker to "escape from nynegocentrism",[64] that is to exclude the situation from *hic et nunc*. Subjectivity as one of evidential dimensions has been pointed out by linguists.[65] The basic idea is that "markers of indirect access convey the value of epistemic uncertainty which, in the weak form, occurs as 'epistemic distance', i.e. the speakers are released from the responsibility for the truth of the utterance".[66]

It is worth stressing that the reportative status of the *quia*-clauses is supported by the logophoric use of the reflexive pronoun in ex. 38.

3.2.4. Potential subjunctive in polemical or repudiating questions

The potential subjunctive in polemical or repudiating questions which sometimes echo the words of someone else can be also treated as a marker of a reported evidence, as seen in ex. 39 and 40.[67]

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[63] About the diachronic changes in the use of the subjunctive vs. indicative mood, see Pinkster 2015, 646–651. Example 38 is taken from it.

[64] Van Rooy 2016, 35.

[65] Nuyts 2001; Makartsev 2013, 321 definitly defines evidentiality as a "category of making distance from information transmitted".

[66] Plungian 2010, 47.

[67] The examples are taken from Pinkster 2015, 486.

(39) I, *redde* aurum! – **Reddam** ego aurum? (Plaut. *Aul*. 829).

Go now, return the gold. – I should return the gold?

(40) Exercitum tu **habeas** diutius quam populus iussit invito senatu? (Cic. *Att*. 7. 9. 4).

Who are you to keep an army longer than the people have ordered, against the will of the Senate?

The potential subjunctive in such sentences as well as the subjunctive mood in the reason clauses considered in section 3.1.5. (above), creates distance between the speaker and the addressee. It demonstrates that the speaker does not commit himself to the content of the proposition but rather represents it as someone else's opinion.

3.2.5. Gnomic future as a marker of reported evidentiality

As has been indicated in section 3.1.4, the simple future, apart from its purely temporal use, is also used with all sorts of less temporal or even non-temporal values. The simple future, for example, often occurs in statements of a general character expressing common knowledge[68] and is sometimes called *gnomic*. It can be treated as a sort of non-firsthand evidence, as in ex. 41, 42:

(41) ...qui utilitatem defendit **enumerabit** commoda pacis... (Cic. *De Or*. 2. 335)

…the one who will defend expediency will relate the advantages of peace...

(42) Donec eris sospes, multos **numerabis** amicos (Ov. *Tr*. 1. 9. 5).

While you are happy, you usually have many friends.

4. Conclusions

In this paper, I have attempted to show the importance of evidentiality as one of the possible approaches for analyzing the grammatical system of Latin. The analysis concerned some morphological forms and syntactic constructions which, in terms of traditional Latin grammars, pertain to the grammatical categories of tense, voice, mood and so forth, but have never been regarded as evidentials. My claim is that considering these

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[68] See about common knowledge as a type of non-direct evidentiality Plungian 2010, 37; Van Rooy 2016, 8.

grammatical phenomena as evidential strategies allows us to enrich our understanding of the Latin language and to realize that the traditional inventory of grammatical forms and constructions can express many more values than one might have expected.

It is clear that the Latin grammatical system demonstrates a whole array of means for conveying the basic semantic values of evidentiality. There are three strategies of expressing first-hand (direct) evidence, five morphological and syntactic tools for rendering the inferential evidentiality and five strategies of transmitting the reported evidences. The next studies in this realm could reveal even more linguistic devices relating to the source of information or the speaker's attitude towards knowledge. It would be interesting to investigate Latin deictic particles as probable evidential markers, or to single out lexical expressions with different evidential meanings as well as combinations of grammatical and lexical tools within a single proposition. One could study the distinctions in the use of the evidential strategies I have singled out in literary vs. vulgar Latin or in the works belonging to different literary genres. The pragmatic and discourse functions of Latin evidentials also seem to deserve close attention. All these topics look forward to being a subject of further investigations.

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The paper aims at drawing attention to certain phenomena in Latin which can be treated as evidential strategies. In Introduction, a brief overview of the existing viewpoints concerning the grammatical category of evidentiality is provided, then a question of the interrelation between evidentiality and epistemic modality is touched upon and author's methodological approach to the issue is outlined.

In the main part of the paper, the author provides an overview of the linguistic strategies used to mark the main types of access to information, i.e. direct (perceptual) evidence, indirect inferential (or presumptive) evidence, and indirect reported evidence. The author singles out thirteen morphological and syntactic means to express different kinds of evidential values (e.g. Infinitive or Participle constructions, historic present, modal use of the subjunctive mood with inferential or reportative overtones, logophoric use of the reflexive pronouns etc.). The author's claim is that these strategies belong to the grammar rather than to the lexicon of the Latin language and, therefore, can be treated as evidential strategies. Considering these grammatical phenomena as evidential strategies may enrich one's understanding of the Latin language and help to realize that the traditional inventory of grammatical forms and constructions can express many more values than one might have expected.

Автор статьи ставит перед собой следующие задачи: выделить в латинском языке элементы, которые могут быть названы эвиденциальными стратегиями, и показать, что эти стратегии относятся скорее к грамматическим, чем к лексическими средствам выражения категории эвиденциальности. Во введении представлен аналитический обзор существующих точек зрения о природе и способах выражения эвиденциальности в разных языках; отдельно разбирается вопрос о соотношении категорий эвиденциальности и эпистемической модальности, который представляется важным, поскольку часть маркеров эвиденциальности в латыни одновременно служит для выражения модальных значений; обосновывается выбор термина "эвиденциальные стратегии" для описания релевантных явлений.

В главной части статьи автор последовательно разбирает латинские морфологические и синтаксические средства маркирования доступа к информации в соответствии с принятой классификацией: показатели прямого доступа, косвенные инферентивные и косвенные репортативные показатели. Для каждой обнаруженной в латинском языке эвиденциальной стратегии автор находит параллели в других языках. В итоге, в арсенале латинских маркеров доступа к информации обнаруживается 3 стратегии прямого доступа, 5 способов выражения инференциальной (презумптивной) эвиденциальности и 5 – репортативной. В заключении намечаются направления дальнейших исследований категории эвиденциальности в латинском языке.